




1.1 Regulating Hate Speech in the EU 
 
Natalie Alkiviadou 
Notwithstanding the perplexities associated with deﬁning hate speech as a result of 
the free speech debate, the EU managed, after seven long years of negotiations 
(European Commission 2014: 1), to take a major leap forward in 2008 with its 
Framework Decision on Combatting Racism and Xenophobia through Criminal 
Law (Council of the European Union 2008). As is reflected in its title, this is not a 
document dealing with hate speech per se but, instead, with some of the phenomena 
underlying such speech. However, it was hate speech that kept the negotiations 
going for so many years and, particularly, the signiﬁcant divergences in the legal 
traditions of EU member states vis-à-vis free speech (European Commission 2014: 
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1). These varying understandings of hate speech also mean that, regardless of the 
Framework Decision at the EU level, there is little coherence amongst EU member 
states on the deﬁnition of hate speech. To this end, in February 2017, the European 
Parliament put forth a motion for a resolution on establishing a common legal 
deﬁnition of hate speech in the EU (European Parliament  2017). 
In light of this, this section will consider the main characteristics of the legal 
frameworks of the ten countries participating in the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project.6 This 
will allow us to see how hate speech is approached on a decentralised (member-state) 
level and determine possible convergences and divergences amongst the member 
states themselves. Before moving on, however, it is worth noting that the term ‘hate 
speech’ is not found in any of the legislations of the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. project partner 
countries; rather, all these countries transposed or acceded to the United Nation’s 
ICCPR (UN General Assembly 1966) and ICERD (UN General Assembly 1965), 
with the UK making a reservation to the relevant articles on the grounds of free 
speech. As will be demonstrated below, regardless of the ratiﬁcation or accession to 
the aforementioned UN documents, the transposing laws are not the ones habitually 
relied upon to tackle hate speech. A relevant example is Denmark, where a court was 
faced with the statement ‘negroes are less intelligent than Europeans’, which falls 
within the framework of statements pertaining to racial superiority, prohibited by the 
ICERD; yet, this was deemed to be permissible speech, as it was made as part of a 
political debate.7 With this in mind, we can now turn to the legal provisions of each 
C.O.N.T.A.C.T. partner country in alphabetical order below. 
The main anti-hate speech legislation in Cyprus is The Combatting Certain 
Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by means of Criminal Law 134 
(I) of 2011, which transposed the Framework Decision into national law. Cyprus 
chose to incorporate the provision of punishing only conduct which is either carried 
out in a manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting. Cyprus went a step further from the protected characteristics of the 
supra-national level and also passed Law 87 (I)/2015 amending the Criminal Code. 
This amendment incorporates Article 99A into the Criminal Code, which punishes 
hate speech targeted at a person or person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. In 
sum, there is no explicit deﬁnition of hate speech in Cyprus but, instead, a trans- 
position of supra-national documents which offer their own appraisals of hate 
speech and which set out varying thresholds. This results in a discordant legal 
setting which, nevertheless, has the positive feature of going beyond the hierarchy 
of hate embraced by the supra-national framework by incorporating the grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected characteristics in the sphere of 
hate speech. Still, the above legislation has not yet been used in Court and there is 




6It should be noted that the information provided in this section in relation to each member state’s 
national context has been synthesised from the desktop research conducted by C.O.N.T.A.C.T. 
partners in each member state during the ﬁrst stages of the project, rather than this section’s author. 
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In Denmark, hate speech is connected to Section 266b of the Danish Penal Code 
which criminalises expressions that “publicly or with intent to disseminate to a 
wider circle, threaten, insult or degrade a group of persons on the basis of race, skin 
colour, nationality, ethnicity, faith or sexual orientation”. Evidently, this deﬁnition 
is more extensive than its supra-national counterparts, as it includes grounds such as 
sexual orientation. Important to this understanding of hate speech is that expres- 
sions must be made publicly or with an intention to disseminate to a wider circle, 
and, therefore, private conversations do not fall within the prohibited sphere. Unlike 
Cyprus, Denmark has relevant case-law which, inter alia, sheds light on the 
meaning of terms used in Section 266b. For example, the statement ‘coloured 
people like you are not allowed in my parents’ apartment’ which was uttered in a 
nursing home, was not considered by a District Court to be punishable, as the 
nursing home was deemed as not constituting a public   place.8 
In Greece, the main national legislation is Law No 927/1797 on punishing acts 
or activities aimed at racial discrimination, as amended by Law 4285/2014 that 
implements the Framework Decision. Article 1 deals with public incitement to 
violence, hatred or discrimination against a person or group of persons due to their 
race, colour, religion, status, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or 
disability if this poses a danger to public order or constitutes a threat to the life, 
liberty or physical integrity of the person or persons involved and is punished with a 
prison sentence ranging from three months to three years and with a monetary ﬁne 
of ﬁve thousand to twenty thousand euros. The scope of protected characteristics of 
this law is, together with Lithuania and Spain, discussed below, one of the most 
extensive in the C.O.N.T.A.C.T. partner countries, incorporating grounds such as 
disability, which is not found elsewhere. While there have been several relevant 
cases before Greek courts, one characteristic example which demonstrates a 
threshold that needs to be met, in terms of the impact of the speech and its publicity, 
involved a Golden Dawn member. In this case, the defendant stated on camera that 
‘we are ready to open the kilns. To make soaps. Not for the people, since … we may 
fall sick …’ These were some of the phrases he used to refer to migrants. The court 
decided that, even if these phrases were exaggerations, they demonstrated the 
accused’s intention publicly to provoke people to cause harm to migrants, so that 
the rest of them would be convinced to abandon   Greece.9 
The main relevant Italian Law is Law 205/1993 which makes it a crime to 
“propagate ideas based on racial superiority or racial or ethnic hatred, or to instigate 
to commit or commit acts of discrimination for racial, ethnic, national or religious 
motives.” The law also punishes those who “instigate in any way or commit vio- 
lence or acts of provocation to violence for racist, ethnic, national or religious 
motives.” Although there are no strict thresholds to meet, such as public order, as is 
the case of Cyprus for example, Italy limits itself to the protected characteristics of 




8Judgment no. 1.4.6 The District Court (Hillerød). 
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In Lithuania, the central provision dealing with this issue is Article 170 of the 
Criminal Code entitled ‘Incitement against Any National, Racial, Ethnic, Religious 
or Other Group of Persons.’ This article punishes the handling or distribution of 
impugned material and expression, which incites hatred, violence, discrimination or 
contempt for a person or persons belonging to a group deﬁned by sex, sexual 
orientation, race, nationality, language, descent, social status, religion, convictions 
or views. This deﬁnition is particularly broad including grounds such as sex but also 
convictions, which are not necessarily afﬁliated with religion. Its threshold is also 
low, with discriminatory expression also falling in the net of prohibited expression. 
Interestingly, in relation to the punishment of expression (rather than material), the 
article also renders ridiculing expression a punishable offence. It also punishes a 
person who publicly incites violence against a person or persons of a particular 
group. To give an example from case law, a defendant was found guilty for publicly 
mocking a person of Asian origin in front of others with obscene epithets saying 
that ‘foreigners are not welcome here.’10 This demonstrates the low threshold 
necessary in Lithuania for ﬁnding speech  hateful. 
The central provision in Malta is Article 82 of the Maltese Criminal Code, which 
punishes any person who 
uses any threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written or 
printed material which is threatening, abusive or insulting or otherwise conducts himself in 
such a manner, with intent to stir up violence or racial hatred against another person or 
group on the grounds of gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, race, colour, language, 
ethnic origin, religion or belief or political or other  opinion. 
The protected characteristics are also broad in Malta, although not as broad as, for 
example, Greece, which also incorporates the grounds of disability, Lithuania, 
which also includes sex or as Romania and Spain discussed   below. 
In Romania, Article 369 of the Criminal Code prohibits “public incitement by 
any means, hatred or discrimination against a class of persons.” Order 137 of 2000 
sets outs the protected characteristics which are race, nationality, ethnicity, lan- 
guage, religion, social, belief, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, non-
contagious chronic disease, HIV infection and membership of a disadvantaged 
group. This is the only country to incorporate HIV positive persons as protected by 
hate speech legislation and which incorporates a broad ground of disadvantaged 
groups. Moreover, by incorporating discrimination, the threshold of prohibition 
remains low. 
As for Spain, although, like for other countries, there is no legislative deﬁnition 
of hate speech, the Constitutional Court held that hate speech is a “heavy burden of 
hostility that incites, directly or indirectly, violence by way of humiliation.”11 The 
main piece of legislation is Article 510 of the Criminal Code on the incitement to 
hate crime, violence and discrimination. This punishes those who provoke dis- 
crimination,   hate   or   violence   against  groups   or   associations  due   to racist, 
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anti-Semitic reasons or any other reasons related to ideology, religion or belief, 
family situation, belonging to an ethnic group or race, national origin, gender, 
sexual preference, illness or handicap. The grounds for protected characteristics in 
Spain are extensive and the thresholds low, incorporating, for example, discrimi- 
nation and not requiring, for example, the disturbance of public  order. 
Turning to the UK, the Public Order Act 1986 provides that acts intended or 
likely to stir up racial hatred include the use of words or behaviour or display of 
written material, the publishing or distribution of written material, the public per- 
formance of plays, the distribution, showing or playing of a recording and/or the 
broadcasting of a programme in a cable programme service. The offence of stirring 
up religious hatred has been deﬁned and incorporated into the 1986 Public Order 
Act by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, with Sections 29B-F of the latter 
addressing the issue of stirring up religious hatred in the same way as it does its 
racial hatred counterpart. However, in relation to religious hatred, Section 29J of 
the Racial and Religious Hatred Act stipulates  that 
nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts 
discussion criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of par- 
ticular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or 
the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different 
religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief  system. 
Therefore, in relation to religious hatred, the threshold is higher, since expression 
such as insulting a particular religion is deemed  permissible. 
From the above approaches to hate speech and the variations therein, it could be 
argued that, although some common elements can be discerned, “hate speech seems 
to be whatever people choose it to mean” (Kiska 2012: 110) As we have seen in the 
previous section, at the supra-national EU level, protected groups are limited to ethnic 
and religious groups, demonstrating an adoption of a hierarchy of hate in such arenas, 
with some characteristics perceived as simply being more important than others. At 
the national level, countries such as Lithuania, Romania, Spain and Malta have an 
extensive conceptualisation of protected groups whilst others such as Italy limit 
themselves to those set out by the UN and the EU. The thresholds of what is con- 
sidered prohibited speech also varies amongst countries, with Italy having a lower 
threshold, prohibiting, for example, ideas of racial superiority, and Cyprus incorpo- 
rating safety nets such as the impact of public disorder. On a last but important note, 
these conceptual variations of deﬁnitions render effective challenging of online hate 
on the borderless medium known as the internet particularly complex. 
 
 
  
  
 
